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SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS: AN INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

The Sino-Indian conflict and cooperation loom large in academic and public debates on security issues in the changed global geo-political situation after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In the 21st century both are poised to become a major powers. The reason been the decline of military power and the enhancement of economic capabilities of the both the countries, The past records speak of unfortunate political and military relations. Despite the fact, the Chinese government has emphasised on the concept of 'Peaceful Rise of China.' What the term means to India. Is it a peaceful competition between both the countries, knowing that China's grand design has always been aggressive. The article deal with Sino-Indian political, military and economic relations. Moreover, an efforts have been made to assess the role of USA, Russia and Pakistan in Sino-India relations.

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INTRODUCTION

An important development that took place in the Asian power-politics was the change of regimes in China and India in 2013 and 2014 respectively. In the 21st century one witness major shift in their security policies. Since assuming power, the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, had shown its interest in improving the relations in South Asian region in particular and the world in general. Modi's swearing-in- ceremony saw all the leaders of South Asia together. This move was not just symbolic as the new government appears to strengthen its ties with neighbouring countries. Equally important was the upgrading of the relations with China. This has been one of the biggest achievements of India's new foreign policy. China's concerns with India is about border issues, opening of the Chinese markets for India products and keeping Chinese influence in India's neighbourhood in check. On a larger canvas, an emerging India has come up against an even larger China. Today, China is looked upon as a major power because of the development of its economic power, but the process of economic development has been peaceful.

Hence, as such India's relationship with China needs to be carefully addressed and managed. Towards, the end of the 20th century the world saw the rise of China and India as an economic power. Both witnessed economic growth since the initiation of economic reforms. In China, the process of economic reform started in 1978 by Den Xiaoping. On the other hand, India's economic reforms started in 1990s when the policy of liberalization and markets were formulated. The results were encouraging. The Indian economic growth increased from 3 to 4 percent in 1980s to 5 to 7 percent in 1990s and reached 9 percent growth in mid 2000's. India and China are both great countries of Asia with a long historical background. Both the countries command prime geo-strategic locations, have vast human resources, strong technological industrial-base, potential military power and an unprecedented economic growth. Both the countries are on the verge of achieving the great power status in international politics. China's constant rise has disturbed India either through the policy of encirclement or alliances but India's reaction is a restrained one. This type of 'Great Game' is quite evident in the military, diplomatic and economic spheres. Globalization has not replaced regionalism, nor geo-economics has replaced geo-politics.

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Some cooperation is evident, in line with international relations liberalism/functionalism. However, it is important to stress the factor of geo-politics and geo-strategy to attain national interests and security dilemma perception which still shape much of their actions. (Scott, 2008)

The New Power Politics

In essence, the New Power Politics theory indicates competitions, influence, power, hegemony and profits (Edwards, 2003) in various ways in the same spatial arena i.e. Pacific-Asia, South Asia, the Indian Ocean and Central Asia. Oceanic elements are important geopolitical factors in the Sino-Indian relations. Therefore, even if the territorial disputes were resolved between India and China they would still retain a competitive relationship in the Asia-Pacific region and these two powers aspire to achieve the status of Great Power. (Chieng-Peng, 2004) To achieve Great Power status three areas become important. These are military-security, economic and diplomacy.

Military Factor

To India, the opening of Lhasa to Golmund railway in summer 2006 was seen by India experts as major China's strategic development since 1950s. It alters the military balance in China's favour and enables significantly greater and quicker feeder facilities for China's military supplies, garrisons and airfields. (Borach, 2006) Moreover, the Himalayas do not pose any significant barrier to military operations from the Chinese held position in Tibetan plateau against high mountains on the India side, especially in the missile age and with China holding such an advantageous position. Historically, it would be prudent to consider that Tibet was part of the original greater game and recognized as a potent base for air power by British strategies in 1946. (Boobst, 2005) This proved true when China attacked India in 1962 and India has suffered heavily. Till now, the military relations between them have not improved.

In order to play a major role in regional and global politics, China emphasis is on modernisation of its military weapons. China has increased its defence budget but the actual figure of the budget remains secret. It is also evident that the strong People's Liberation Army (PLA) comprising of 2.25 million soldiers is to contain the USA from intervening in Taiwan and the South China Sea. The increasing capabilities of Chinese strategies forces are cause of great concern for India. The PLA holds large number of nuclear capable missile arsenal with ICBMs and SLBMs. Its 75 submarines, including 10 nuclear powered, over 2000 fighter jets, more than 7500 main battle tanks and 75 major warships could pose a serious threat to India's 1.3 million armed forces with limited nuclear capability, the conventional submarines, 30 major warships, 500 fighter jets and 3000 main battle tanks. (Das, 2011) The recent the successful test of Anti-Satellite technology by China confirms the Chinese expansionist designs. China's strategy has seen from two perspectives: (1) to develop economically and (2) to work for the development of military capabilities.

Economic Development

In the early 1980s, Den Xiaoping China's has been emphasizing on hiding capabilities and biding for time" to

improve its economic conditions. In 2002 to 2007 the Chinese Communist Party Congress was to build a well off society by 2020" in order to match the socio-economic standard of the developed western European countries. All efforts were made towards conversion of the nation into a "rich and strong army". The Chinese leadership had codified these as seizing "strategic opportunities" especially after the U.S. attack on Iraq and Afghanistan. However, as a result of the rise of China in hard and soft power aspects, new approaches are seen in its external responses that point towards maximalist foreign policy perspectives versus active role in international political and economic institutions and multilateral associations. (Saunders, 2004)

The economic growth of both China and India, after 1991 was a positive sign in achieving their internal and external security goals. It changed the world perception about the both the countries. The USA and the western world perceptions have changed and regards India as the emerging economic power. Comparing India with China, China is better placed. In 2012, China accounted for more than 40 percent of the global growth while India growth was about 10 percent. Together their economic growth constituted half of the world's economy. In 2009, China became the largest exporting country in the world with an estimated \$1.2 million in goods and services and even surpassed Germany. With 10 percent rise in GDP growth for over a decade. China, too replaced Japan as the second largest economy after the USA. If Goldman Sachs, the investment bank, prediction is to be believed then the Chinese economic growth will surpass the USA by 2027.

As compared to China, India's performance is quite poor. On the other hand, the strength of China in terms of comprehensive national power has significant strategies ramifications. Indian companies have certain limitation as compared to the China. Most Indian companies are private owned and the Chinese companies are state owned and well supported by state financial institutions like China Development Bank Cooperation and Exim Bank. The Chinese companies are more focused on the profit and these loss. Hence, companies enjoy faster rate of profit. In the Indian case, a unique situation arises where the private sectors and the government do not seem to complement each other's efforts. An important similarity is seen in case in both the countries economic development. These countries depends upon skilled manpower, with low wages. An increasing export surge drives China's economic growth while India's import dependent economy relies primarily on domestic consumption for growth. Indian imports currently exceed exports by 60 percent. India's dependency on imports also sets the country apart from the Asia tiger economy which are export driven. India must guard against becoming a raw material appendage of the Chinese economy. (Chellany, 2008)

Politico-Diplomatic Strength

53 years have passed since both countries have engaged in a war and more than 30 years they have agreed for border settlement negotiations. Still, then, the entire borders from Kashmir to Arunachal Pradesh are unsolved. Attempts, were made for resolving the border disputes when the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi visited China in 1988.

More than 14 rounds have taken place but no concrete progress has been made. Generally, it is assumed that Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China might bring the countries closer. Hence, both countries signed various bilateral agreements so that they can conclude a fair settlement on the boundary issue. In 1988, a Joint Working Group was formed. The Peace and Tranquility Treaty of 1993 was signed in Beijing. Both the countries also worked for confidence building measures in 1996. Special representatives were appointed in 2003 to explore the framework of a boundary steersmen from the political perspective. In 2015, both the countries concluded Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for Settlement of the Boundary Question. They also agreed to work for Civil Nuclear Cooperation in 2006 and shared vision for the 21st Century in 2008.

Not resolving the border issue has kept India on the backfoot. Beginning around the second half of 2009, China became more aggressive on border issues, especially Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh. It also threatened Indian population who were engaged in building subsidiary roads and water channels. Further, stapled visas was deprived only to Indian of Kashmiri origin who became a victims of Chinese policy. As a result in 2011, India cancelled military delegation to China. But in 2012, China softened its stand by allowing the visit of military delegation to India. On the question of issuing stapled separate visas to Indian passport holders from Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu Kashmir, China began to project Jammu and Kashmir as an independent state in the media. Moreover, Pakistan was offered economic assistance by China to construct a dam on Indus in the POK. In spite of the fact, that both the countries are not strategic opponents, the important question was how both can manage the element of competition within the agreed strategic framework which permit both to pursue their core interest. (Times of India, 2012)

The major problem that hampers the relations the two countries was the question of Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh. These regions are generally seen by China as a part of greater Tibetan issue. China still date has not made a successor to the present Dalai Lama who is operating from outside Tibet. As such, China has already prepared grounds to escalate the issue by claiming Tawang. The 134 km Pangong Se Lake in Eastern Ladakh extends from India to Tibet. Two-thirds of the region is controlled by China. (Ibid, 2009) More recently, in June, 2014 the Chinese again came up with a map showing Tawang as a part of Tibet. This position was maintained in 2015 also.

China's projection of peaceful rise seems aimed at allaying the concerns of its neighbours lest they try to counterbalance its growing influence. The Chinese foreign policy strategy is aimed at protecting China from external threats as it pursue its geo-political interest so as to continue with the economic reforms and thereby increase its comprehensive national power without having to deal with the impediments and distractions of security competition. (Paul, 2008) Hence, China has diverted its strategic energies on Asia. China's peaceful rise to a great extent is related to her in security policies. This is Chinese method of works against India. For example, to put a brake on the Indian military power, it has pursued a policy of strategic

encirclement, particularly on maritime front. This Chinese game plan is to upset Indian strategic calculation in its immediate neighbourhood. China is careful about it move and in this direction expanded trade relations and ideological support to littoral countries of Indian Ocean region. China has assisted Pakistan on several issues, cultivated strategic partnership with various countries of Asia and even supported them in the development of nuclear and missile technologies. It seem as assertive China tries to dominate the region by not only expanding military capability in her periphery but away from her shores as well. This will help her to enforce regional subordination and then try for Sino-centric solutions, including unilateral concessional on India-China border.

The Chinese projection of maritime interests in the Indian Ocean Region has been the major reason for future economic flashpoint. Ports and associated maritime infrastructural areas are of immense importance. Both the countries can clash in controlling choke points, flowing easy of trade on the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) and exploiting resources in the form of offshore oil and gas, fish food and seabed minerals, creating Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf. This will no doubt create a hostile political and strategic environment. India at least needs energy to sustain 9 to 10 percent growth to keep pace with China. This will enhance the possibility of the Indian Ocean Region to become a zone of conflict. The acceptance of the Chinese soft attitude of China towards Pakistan, Maldives, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar have affected the strategic environment of the Indian Ocean Region. China's development in the IOR India has been affected by Chinese presence in Indian Oceans Region:

- China's policy of "string of pearl along the Indian Ocean rim is an indication of its desire for a fourth "strategic corridor" that might create a challenge to Indian from the South. China's has started working on creating forwards listening posts, naval assess agreements and building harbours.
- To the north-south trans Karakoram China, has built Gwador Port of Pakistan, at the very entrance to the Strait of Hormuz to Sinkiang. Plans are also to develop an energy pipeline from Gwador to western China through Gwador-Dalbandin railway which could be extended upto Rawalpindi. This will reduce the time for transporting oil to China from the Gulf region. In addition, the Chinese have supported Makran Coastal Highway links Gwador with Karachi. Gwador can be utilized by the Chinese navy-for war purposes.
- To the east of India, there is an Irrawaddy corridor , involving road, river and rail that links from Yunnan Province to Myanmar's ports in Bay of Bengal. This links also had the potential to bypass the vulnerabilities of sea routes through East and South China seas and the Malacca strait.

Furthermore, China emphasis on different kinds of warfares – media, psychological and legal. These are all important for China in promoting the peaceful competition with India. These are:

- India's look East Policy and now Act East Policy included strategic relations with Japan and ASEAN countries, particularly Vietnam to counter China.
- India has concluded strategic and cooperative agreements with Afghanistan, defence pacts with Myanmar and Vietnam.
- Efforts to create an inclusive regional architecture in Asia to convince China's small neighbours to look upon India in order to deter the Chinese assertiveness.
- Indo-US cooperation has worked immensely to contain Chinese activities in the region and elsewhere. This would elevate India's position in international politics.
- There has been growing closeness between India, Russia and China to face the growing menace of religious extremism and terrorism.

The peaceful rise of China between India and China can also be seen how from the role played by the USA-Russia, Pakistan. The Sino-Indian competition has been influenced by the changing international environment. Hence, it needs a critical examination of their role played by these powers.

India-China: The USA Factor

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Indian political decision makers became skeptical about the USA's position in Asia power politics. This could be easily gauged from the US approach towards China and Pakistan in the initial stage. President Barack Obama's first tenure made many democrats to adopt soft attitude in the settlement of the Kashmir issues. But some other critics saw George Bush's policy of pushing India as a counterweight to China as something dangerous.

Actually, it was Bush initiative to work with India had the potential to reshape the Asian balance of power. It was followed by two important agreements: (1) a 10 year defence cooperation where the USA was prepared to supply advanced US weapons and Indo-US Joint Military Exercise; and (2) the civil nuclear cooperation that ended India's isolation from the global non-proliferation regime. To check American role, China opposed Bush's nuclear initiative and later on made similar deals with Pakistan.

On the other hand, US President Obama was more cautious in formulating his policies towards China. Obama's visit to China in 2009 was seen by many strategic experts as an attempt to create Sino-US condominium over Asia. The USA administration underlined the importance of a creation of a new structure of Sino-US cooperation. This led historian Fergusson to call such kind relations as "Chimerica" or "G-2". But, China made it clear that their interest lies elsewhere and creation was not in Chinese interest. Such a development created a delicate position for India as she was more cautious in developing relations with the USA vis-à-vis China. In the beginning, India was not ready to sign communication and information agreement and logistic support agreement. The reason was perhaps India's traditional approach to international politics by opposing the US hegemony that could have ended India's strategic autonomy. But, soon later, the realisations of the realities of global and regional power politics have forced India to reexamine its priorities.

India, then, realized that the political understanding with the USA may well suit her national objective as it would balance a more assertive China in South Asia and Asia-Pacific regions.

Indian-China: the Russian Factor

The crux of India-China-Russia relationship lies in each country interest in Central and South Asia. Central, South Asia and Asia-Pacific region are vital for Russia because these countries are vital to their security because of the terrorist threats in Chechyan, Kashmir and Xin-Ziang regions.

But, Central Asia is one such region where the interest of India-China and Russia coincide. The region is important because it is surrounded by major and regional powers. Russia, China and Iran have strong cultural and ethnic bonds. Afghanistan is a failed state. Pakistan has deep historical contacts and India is the civilization destination. Turkey is the land of the forefather and was also a source of ancient trade linking China, India, the Middle East and the fringe of Europe.

The Russian interests in Central Asia are more concerned because of the fear of penetration of Islamic extremism in its own country. Hence, the protection of the Southern periphery of the Commonwealth of Independent states have become important for her security. To cope with the situation, Russia has come out with Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) comprising of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

To India, she considers these five Central Asian States as part of its extended neighbourhood. Since the majority of the population in Central Asia is Muslim, India, too is facing the problem of terrorism and separatism, particularly after the ouster of Mohd. Najibullah by the forces of religious extremism. India is more interested in developing the secular fabric of the countries of Central Asia. So far, China is concerned she is much more concerned about extremism and separatism. The region has become important because China shares border with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In order to solve this difficult problem, China has come up with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). India has been admitted as an observer to the SCO at the Astana Summit. In July 2015, India became a full member of SCO. Indian support has always been to develop economic cooperation, ensure stability and fight against terrorism and separatism. Some specific areas which were debated at various SCO meeting were;

- evolving security situation in Afghanistan
- capacity building in Central Asia
- connectivity with the Eurasian region
- energy cooperation
- counter terrorism and anti-narcotism.

India, China and Russia are facing a peculiar problem which had affected their security and it could erode their autonomy. One way of solving the issues of terrorism and religious extremism is to make the region economically viable and sustainable. All the three have economic interests in Central Asia. For, e.g., new areas of cooperation have emerged between Russia and India.

These are: textiles, light industry and agriculture in the form of new farming techniques. India has vast experience in operating a Soviet type of industrial infrastructures. Indian managerial skill can be matched with Russian expertise in upgrading, modernizing and developing new enterprises in the medium and small-scale sectors. India has already invested some \$2.7 bn in the Sakhalin project on natural gas. In 2012-13 India-Central Asian trade reached \$ 346 million. Russian-Central Asia trade was \$28 bn and China-Central Asian trade was \$ 46bn. Hence, all the three countries would have to work in a holistic manner to engage these states politically and economically which are of common interests to them.

India-China: The Pakistani Factor

China has been the most trusted friend of Pakistan's over the past several decades. The reasons for close cooperation are the US-Soviet rapprochement, Sino-Soviet dispute, Sino-India conflict, Chinese Cultural Revolution and Sino-American Ping Pong diplomacy. These development in 1970s onward brought the three – the USA-China-Pakistan-closer to work against India. As a result, India had no other option but to opt for Soviet's friendship. Their hostile attitude led to Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty signed in 1971 and it checked the US and the Chinese move in Indo-Pak war of 1971. This strange relationship among these powers persisted till the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Pakistan has always been major policy asset for China. The rise of India as an economic power and the increasing US-India proximity has also brought Pakistan more to China in promoting her grand design. China and Pakistan have cultivated all weather strategic partnership. There exist vast economic cooperation between them to the tune of \$30 bn. The two countries agreed to widen the Chinese built technology, banking, infrastructural development, heavy machine manufacturing and finance. Pakistan's increased nuclear missile capabilities owes much to China. Pakistan's nuclear weapon delivery vehicle stockpiles have affected her nuclear deterrent theory. The recent revelation is that China is negotiating to build three new nuclear plants worth \$ 13 bn in Muzaffargarh district of Pakistan's Punjab province. (Paul, 2008) Though it is claimed by both the countries that Chinese-aided nuclear power will address Pakistani's electricity blackouts but the real intention behind Sino-Pakistani nuclear energy cooperation is containment of India. India has always been in the crosshairs of the "all weather alliance" between China and Pakistan since 1950s. (<http://www.deccanchronicle.com>, 2014)

Pakistan is seen as the possessor of the "world's fastest growing nuclear arsenal." According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Pakistani's nuclear stockpile has risen from a low of 90 bombs to a high of 120 bombs between 2011-12. India's inventory nukes remains at least 10 bombs shorter than what Pakistan has. Meanwhile, China's stockpile has inched up from 240 to 250 nukes in the same period. (Ibid, 2014) Moreover, Chinese fighter aircraft and naval ships have increased Pakistan's military strength. Shen Dingli, a well known columnist, believes that China would like to set up military bases in the neighborhood

possibly Pakistan to conduct retaliatory attack in the area on potential enemies if required to protect oversea interests. Indian think tanks endorse the view by saying that foreign base is seen as a symbol of world power. (Times of India, 2010) At present, according to government input, more than 122 Chinese companies are active in Pakistan. Some of them are as follow:

- Karakoam Highway Upgradation : The China Road and Bridge Corporation has given preferential credit of \$ 327m through its Exim Bank. The MOU's on double laning of the Karakoram Highway has also been signed.
- Pakistan-China Rail Link : It is a 750 km long rail line between Havelian and the Khunjerab pass along the Karakoram Highway.
- Jhelum Bridge : Chinese state company has got a contract for constructing a major bridge on river Jhelum at Dhangale in Mirpur district. The estimated cost is Rs 1.2 bn.
- Xin-Jiang Road and Bridge Construction Company of China is already working to replace five existing bailey bridges on the 167 km long, which is located on important Gilgit-Skadu road.
- China financial supports to Diamer-Bhasha dam is to the tune of \$ 11.3 bn.
- China's Gezhouba Water and Power Cooperation has already a consortium that will take Neclum-Jhelum Hydro Power Project in Muzafarabad district.

India's Reaction

Today, China has promoted her interests in such a way that it can dictate terms to its allies and foes. Chinese nationalism has also made her a prosperous and strong military power. The Chinese President, Xi Jinping, the son of a Chinese military veteran asked the defence forces to use battle ready standards in undertaking combat preparation and prepare to win regional war. It shows Chinese military posture has proved to be quite aggressive and as a result it could develop a countervailing coalition among its neighbours.

All these Chinese developments have shown the rise of dominant country in the world. Whether China will embark on this needs greater understanding of the Chinese security policy. This peaceful rise policy has to been seen on Chinese perception of peaceful competition. Hence, peaceful competition could be based on aggressive or passive tendencies. In case of India, China will increasingly compete in all areas of activity so that India's role in regional or global power politics could be minimized.

On the issue of military deployment, India has shifted its strategy to stabilise western front and strengthen northern front as well as give equal emphasis on land and sea warfare. In term of military policy, India has now focusing on active and aggressive defence. This is quite different from the earlier policy of passive defence. It is true that Indian decision makers believe that threats are more from China than Pakistan a more political viable China, a fast developing economy, military modernization and increasing comprehensive national willpower will compel India to reassess the Chinese threat.

As such what can India do in terms of improving the land, air and seapower capabilities?

Options for India Army: Today, the need for Indian army is:

- Increasing firepower support in the mountains, including attack helicopters and artillery.
- Small unit operations support by adequate firepower;
- Emphasis on armoured protected mobile vehicles for units that can engage the enemy and mountainous terrain;
- Cooperation and proper coordination of land and airpower;
- Acquiring missile that could prove more reliable and accurate in striking targets in mountains.

Indian Air Force: The Indian Air Force must consider the following options:

- Planning to operate the bulk of its assets in the Eastern sector from airfields deep inside India;
- Increasing the number of airbases away from the border and maximizing the aerial refueling capabilities;
- Improving long range strike capabilities that could deal with the enemy;
- Increasing operational coordination with the other two wings of the armed forces;

Indian Navy: The options are:

- Acquiring new submarines and strengthening of the proposed plans to counter. The opponent's plans in the Indian Ocean.
- Developing adequate number of the fourth generation of multi role combat aircraft;
- Strengthening surveillance assets with simultaneous anti-access capability;
- Coastal defence should be more functional in response to the Chinese nuclear submarines, fleet;
- Developing long range anti-ship ballistic missile capability for ship.

Conclusion

In the coming years Asia-Pacific region will be one such major region where the great powers will play a more dominant role. The times has come to balance Chinese challenges. It seems that China is a not more threat but it is big challenge. Hence, India needs to develop positive policy on China by having more affirmative dialogue with China.

Indian security challenges are two fold : (1) the development of military and strategic capabilities to protect its zone of interests particularly in Tibet Autonomous Region and Indian Ocean Region and (2) India is not only aware of Chinese military capabilities but is also concerned with unconventional warfare such as information warfare and cyber warfare. China still believes in Sun Tzu dictum, "for to win hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting in the acme of skill." This asymmetry in strategic power has to be minimised.

Hence, from an Indian viewpoint, she must also be ready to read the Chinese mind in Tibet. The Chinese strategy of subduing the enemy without fighting needs further careful analysis. If, India develop its own anti access and non-contact warfare doctrine, China will be forced to traverse the collaborative path. Diplomatically, India has to maintain better relations with major and regional powers so that the confrontational behaviour of China can be contained not only in South Asia but also elsewhere. Today, the need is for India is the diplomatic and strategic de-encirclement of South Asia. This mean meaningful presence in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Mauritius and Seychelles. The diplomatic initiative taken by Narendra Modi is a clear indication of India's calculated move to make South Asia free of conflict. India has already strengthened its relations with the USA and Russia so that it can balance Sino-Pakistan nexus.

The core of india's strength is economic and sustainable growth. The GDP growth and good governance as promised by the new government will lead to more equitable distribution of wealth and will generate more jobs. At international level, competitive economic and South Asian countries vis-à-vis China will enhance India's relative bargaining power and status. Besides this, India should also cultivate its relations with African countries who are rich in natural resources. India should also engage China politically and socially in a positive manner. Emphasis on trade, economic and cultural relation with China will, no doubt, influence India's activities and will cultivate more friendly atmosphere in the region.

Hence, there is a great need for Indian political decision makers to understand and apply close links between defence and development and peaceful rise and completion through pursuance of national security objectives using our comprehensive national power. The present government should work for more pragmatic and flexible foreign policy and defence policies backed by strong national character and willpower so that India can look into her non-traditional threats as well as Chinese meaning of comprehensive national power in the future.

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