



ISSN: 0975-833X

RESEARCH ARTICLE

**THE METAMORPHOSIS OF 'BOKO HARAM' TO AN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTAL SECT AND THE
BURDEN OF INSECURITY IN NORTHERN NIGERIA**

***Dr Joseph O. Fayeye and Obasanjo S. Balogun**

¹Centre for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria

²Department of Sociology, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria

ARTICLE INFO

Article History:

Received 27th January, 2012

Received in revised form

14th February, 2012

Accepted 27th March, 2012

Published online 30th April, 2012

Key words:

Boko Haram,
Islamic Fundamentalism,
Terrorism,
Insecurity,
National security.

ABSTRACT

The current terrorist insurgency by the Northern Nigeria-based Islamic fundamentalist-'Boko Haram' has continued to pose serious threats to Nigeria's corporate political entity. This is evidenced in the sect's undeterred spate of terrorist's attacks on citizens, the nation's security personnel, wanton destruction of lives and property. This study focused on the assessment of 'Boko Haram' terrorist activities in Nigeria, and the obvious implications on national security. The study used secondary data source to analyze Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. It concluded with policies options that could enhance effective anti-terrorist strategies in strengthening the security of lives and property in Nigeria political state.

Copy Right, IJCR, 2012, Academic Journals. All rights reserved.

INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian State is threatened; human lives and property are wantonly destroyed and the security system is also equally undermined. These resulted from the violent crimes that are traceable to the Islamic fundamentalist called '*Boko Haram*' which is the operational name of *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad*; the Northern Nigeria-based Islamic sect which has claimed responsibility for human rights violations and crimes against humanity. The issue of insecurity has remained an unresolved tough matter in the Nigerian polity. It has drawn attention to understanding the underlying militating factors against the effective security system in Nigeria. Since 1999, Nigeria's social, economic and political development have been slowed down by frequent insecurity challenges of armed militancy in the Niger Delta region, ethno-religious crises, electoral violence, kidnappings, armed robberies, among others. However, Boko Haram's insurgency has constituted a new insecurity challenge to the Nigerian State. Thus, affirming the foregoing observation, the Deputy Head of Mission of the Israeli Embassy in Nigeria, George Deek, noted that terrorism is one of Nigeria's biggest and most immediate challenges (*Sunday Punch*, 2012, p. 5.).

The above social problems according to Onochie-Igbidou (2011) individually and collectively constitute threats to the peace, security and development of the country; and invariably have implications for the continuity and survival of the nation's nascent democracy. More so, it is succinct to say that each

successive government in Nigeria has had to face one insecurity problem or the other, and this has led to the increase statutory allocation to security in the national budget. The present political administration in Nigeria claimed that the security sector has gulped over a trillion naira (N1 trillion) of the national budgets in its efforts to combat terrorism and insecurity in the nation. However, despite the huge national expenditure on security, it has yielded little or no positive effects. Even the imposition of the State of Emergency in the affected areas has not totally resolved the terrorist activities of this Boko Haram. This study is therefore undertaken to examine how Boko Haram metamorphosed from social movement to an Islamic fundamental sect with activities that threatened the very fabric of the corporate existence of the Nigeria political state.

Aim and Objectives

The aim of this paper is to examine the terrorist activities of Boko Haram and its implications on the national security. The specific objectives include to: assess the origin and development of Boko Haram sect in Nigeria; chronicle timeline of Boko Haram terrorist attacks in the Northern Nigeria; evaluate government's responses to Boko Haram's insurgency; examine the stakeholders' perceptions to Boko Haram's insurgency in Northern Nigeria; and propose adoptable options for stemming the wave of violence and threat to security by Boko Haram sect.

***Corresponding author:** josephfayeye@yahoo.com

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This paper is essentially a desk research with reliance on secondary sources of data in published outlets. Its scope is limited to issue and content analysis of Boko Haram insurgency in North-East geopolitical zone of Nigeria.

Conceptual Clarifications

For the purpose of this study, the following terms central to the study are defined.

- **Boko Haram:** The term means different thing to different people. According to Chothia of BBC African Service, the term is used to refer to Nigeria's militant Islamist group (<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>).
- **Islamic Fundamentalism:** The term refers to a conservative religious movement that seeks a return to Islamic values and Islamic law in the face of western modernism, which is seen as corrupt and atheistic. It is a movement that has gained momentum in recent decades within several Muslim nations. Islamic fundamentalists oppose the infiltration of secular and westernizing influences and seek to institute Islamic law, including strict codes of behaviour. They also target political corruption in Muslim nations (<http://www.answers.com/islamic-fundamentalism>).
- **National Security:** This is a multidimensional concept. Iredia (2011) citing Maier (1990) defined it as a capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity and wellbeing.
- **Security:** According to UNDP (1994) report, security means safety from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression on one hand and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily life on the other hand.
- **Insecurity:** According to Adejumo (2011) [internal] insecurity is not a merely petty crimes, armed robberies, but terrorism and bombings, armed insurgency like Niger Delta problem, Boko Haram massacres and ethnic/religious killings.
- **Sect:** This body of persons adhering to a particular religious faith. It also means a group regarded as heretical or as deviating from a generally accepted religious tradition. (<http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sect>).
- **Terrorism:** There is no precise definition of terrorism, as this depends on the individual's perception, the relativity of activities to be categorized as well as the differences in societal values. *Awake* (June 2011) observed that terrorism is a global problem occurring often around the world. It is noted further that more and more people are resorting to violence, commonly called terrorist acts, to achieve their aims. According to the United States Department (1981) as quoted in Bovard (2003:7) terrorism is the use or threat of use of force for political purpose in violation of domestic or international law. Conklin (2007:59) also defined

terrorism as violence against innocent civilians that produce a powerful psychological impact on an audience far broader than those directly affected, in pursuit of a political, messianic or vengeful goal. Neumann and Smith (2008:8) defined terrorism as the deliberate creation of a sense of fear, usually by the use or threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence, to influence the political behavior of a given target group.

The Origin of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria

Boko Haram which figuratively means "Western or non-Islamic education is a sin," is a controversial Nigerian militant Islamist group that seeks the imposition of *Shariah* laws in 12 northern states of Nigeria. The group started with an undefined structure and chain of command. Its official name is *Jama' atu Ahlis Sunna Ladda' awati wal -Jihad*, which in Arabic means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". The literal translation is "Association of Sunnis for the Propagation of Islam and Holy War". It became known internationally following sectarian violence in Nigeria in 2009. However, the residents of Maiduguri dubbed it *Boko Haram*; which when translated from local Hausa language means "Western education is forbidden". Resident gave it the name because of its strong opposition to Western education, which it sees as corrupting Muslims (Newswatch, 2011, August 1, p. 20). The term *Boko Haram* was said comes from the Hausa word *book* meaning "Animist, western or otherwise non Islamic education" and the Arabic word *haram* figuratively meaning "sin" but literally means "forbidden". As an ideology, *Boko Haram* opposes not only Western education but also Western culture and modern science. As a movement, the group came into existence in the 1960s but only started to draw attention in 2002. The late Mohammed Yusuf became its leader in the same year. In 2004, the group moves to Kanamma, Yobe State, where it set up a base called "Afghanistan", from where it attacked nearby police stations, and killing police officers (Newswatch, 2011; August 1, p. 20). The late leader of the group formed *Boko Haram* in Maiduguri, in 2002; where he set up a religious complex, which included a mosque and an Islamic school. Many poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and other neighboring countries were said to have enrolled their children at the school. The sect also had political goal which was to create an Islamic state; thereby prompting the school to become a recruiting ground for future Jihadists. The group was said to live in its own world and adopted Arabic as its official language.

Boko Haram Sect: A Coat of Many Colours

Boko Haram means different things to different people. The following represent the basic perception of Boko Haram sect.

- **As a Religious Group:** It has been described as an Islamic sect with the official Arabic name of *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad*, meaning the People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad. As part of what the group described as its aim is the entrenchment of *Sharia* in Nigeria, particularly across the Muslims populated Northern States of the country. According

to Umaru Boko Haram does not in any way mean ‘Western education is a sin’ but that ‘Western civilization is forbidden’. The difference is that while the first gives the impression that it opposed to formal education coming from the West, that is Europe, the second affirms our belief in the supremacy of Islamic culture (not education). It includes education but not determined by Western education. Boko Haram, according to Umaru is an Islamic Revolution, which impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria (*Sunday Sun*, 2011 p.10).

- **As an ethnocentric sect:** It has also been described as nothing but an ethnic bias whose formation is mainly seen as a political tool in the hand of those who influence or employ it for achieving political and selfish gains. Hence, it is seen as part of ethnic nationalism. According to Eteng (2004) ethno-nationalism is a phenomenon which denotes the crystallization of socio-cultural consciousness among members of an ethnic group which regards itself both as distinct, identifiable, objective ‘group-in itself’, as well as a group for – itself - a community of interests relative to other ethnic group.
- **As a Terrorist Group:** According to its spokesperson, Sani Umaru, “Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda, which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, and we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized, which is according to the wish of Allah” (*Sunday Sun* 2011, p.10).
- **An outlawed or unlawful society:** The Criminal Code of Nigerian State. CHAPTERS 9 section 62 of the Criminal Code Act, Cap. 77 gives an explicit definition of an unlawful society. Section 62(1) stipulates that a society includes any combination of ten or more persons whether the society be known by any name or not. Section 62 (2) states that society is an unlawful society if:

It formed for any of the following purposes-

- a) levying war or encouraging or assisting any person to levy war on the Government or the inhabitants or any part of Nigeria; or
- b) killing or injuring or encouraging the killing or injuring of any person;
- c) destroying or injuring or encouraging the destruction or injuring of any property; or
- d) subverting or promoting the subversion of the Government or its officials; or
- e) committing or inciting to acts of violence or intimidation; or
- f) interfering with, or resisting, or encouraging interference or resistance to the administration of the law; or
- g) disturbing or encouraging the disturbance of peace and order in any part of Nigeria; or
- h) if declared by an order of the President to be a society dangerous to the good government of Nigeria or any part thereof.

Section 62A clarifies that a society is an unlawful society if it is declared by an order of the National Council of Ministers to be a society dangerous to the good government of Nigeria or of any part thereof. Furthermore, according to Section 63 “any person who manages or assists in the management of an unlawful society is guilty of felony and is liable to imprisonment for seven years”. In the light of the foregoing therefore, Boko Haram, through the eyes of the Law, is an unlawful society, and subject to all forms of legal provisions pertaining to unlawful societies.

The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria: A Critical Review of Facilitating Factors

The origin and the growth of *Boko Haram* in Nigeria have been subjects of critical debates among stakeholders and observers. Many identifiable critical factors were raised as influencing not only *Boko Haram* insurgency, but other socio-economic challenges within the political entity called Nigeria. A few of these are discussed in this section.

- a) **The Great Amalgamation:** Nigeria as a country was a product of the colonial amalgamation. This amalgamation as many scholars have argued is the root of instability and other political-related problems in Nigeria. According to Otite, 1991; Alemika and Chukwuma, (2001) the British colonizers created Nigeria through conquest, deception and manipulation of about four hundred nationalities. Prior to their colonial subjugation, these nationalities maintained different types and scale of social, political and economic organizations. They were relatively independent of one another, although some of them maintained political and economic relationships. Alemika and Chukwuma (2001) pointed out that the amalgamation brought together diverse nationalities. In essence, Nigeria since amalgamation has remained an entity in diversity. Boko Haram therefore developed to forcefully create a mono-religious entity in a secular but multi-religious state.
- b) **The Role of ethnicity:** Ethnicity plays a very significant role not only in the formation of Boko Haram, but as a critical issue in the Nigerian polity. Nigeria is composed of people of different ethnic background. This status over the years has created a structure that gave room for individual group loyalty and ethnic nationalism at the expense of the national interests and development. According to Otite (1990:145), cited in Eteng (2004) ethnic virus has been one of the most important causes of social crisis and political instability in Nigeria. In the same vein, Ikime (1987) also cited in Eteng (2004) noted that ethnic problem in Nigeria is indeed the “National Question”, around which all sorts of crimes have been perpetuated against the nation. This is reflected in the grim reality of Boko Haram casualties are skewed positively against specific ethnic groups in Nigeria.
- c) **Systemic Corruption and leadership failure:** Corruption remains rife because of abuse of the rule of law and absence of the culture of good governance (Fagbenle, 2011). It remains a strong obstacle to nation-building. The combination of corruption and leadership failure has constituted major backdrop against the widespread Boko Haram menace in Nigeria. Consequently, inept leadership has over the years resulted

- in government's failure or inability to ensure adequate protection of citizens' lives and property as Boko Haram continues to threaten national security and development.
- d) **Poverty:** Poverty has been identified as one of the underlying factors in the formation of Boko Haram. According to Adedapo as cited by Bernard (2011, p.19) Boko Haram is the product of poverty and social injustice that has reigned supreme in the Northern part of the country for years. Although poverty is a Nigeria national problem resulting from uncontrolled population explosion, it is not a license for Boko Haram ethno-religious criminal victimization.
- e) **Culture of Impunity:** Most often, crime is committed in Nigeria, but perpetrators are either not identified or arrested. Even when identified and arrested, they may not be properly or justly prosecuted as to achieve deterrence to others. Therefore, this culture of impunity goes along way in encouraging other criminally minded people or criminal opportunists like Boko Haram to perpetrate acts in violation of the country's criminal codes and set of rules.
- f) **Other factors:** Factors like unemployment, illiteracy, leadership negligence, poor governance, are listed among other factors in the rise of the Boko Haram in Nigeria. According to Mohammed, (2011, August 1) the menace of Boko Haram pertains to anger of deprived youths in the country. He added that the high rate of youth unemployment, all manner of crimes such as the activities of Boko Haram, kidnapping and other vices were to be expected. In the same vein, the Galtimari's Panel submitted that the immediate and remote causes of Boko Haram attacks among other were high level of poverty and illiteracy massive unemployment of youths; and existence of private militias that were established, funded and used by politicians and individuals (*Newswatch*, 2011, October 10 p18).
- 20/01/2012: Multiple bomb blasts in various points in Kano city including Police Stations; the State Security Service Headquarters; Kano State Police Command, Bompai; Immigration Passport Office - with several lives lost and properties destroyed.
 - 17/01/2012: Two soldiers were killed by Boko Haram gunmen at a military checkpoint in Maiduguri, Borno State.
 - 13/01/2012: Boko Haram sect killed four and injured two others, including police officers, in two separate attacks in pubs in Yola, Adamawa State and Gombe State.
 - 11/01/2012: Four Christians were killed by Boko Haram gunmen in Potiskum, Yobe State as they stopped for fuel.
 - 10/01/2012: A Boko Haram attacked a beer garden and killed eight persons, including five police officers and a teenage girl in Damaturu, Yobe State.
 - 17/01/2012: Three Christian poker players were killed and seven others wounded by Boko Haram gunmen in Biu Town.
 - 06/01/2012: Eight worshippers were killed in a shooting attack on a church in Yola. Boko Haram gunmen also shot 17 Christian mourners in the town of Mubi, Adamawa State.
 - 05/01/2012: Six worshippers killed and 10 others wounded when Boko Haram gunmen attacked a church in Gombe city.
 - 30/12/2011: Four Muslim Worshippers were killed in a Boko Haram bomblast and shooting attack targeting a military checkpoint in Maiduguri as worshippers left a mosque after attending the jumat prayers.
 - 25/12/2011: A Christmas Day Boko Haram bomb attack on Saint Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla Town, Niger State, killed 42 worshippers, with many other wounded.
 - 22/12/2011: Boko Haram also bombed a part of Maiduguri and killed 20 persons.
 - 17/12/2011: A shootout between sect members and police officers, following a raid on the hideout of a Boko Haram leader in Darmanawa, Kano State, left seven persons dead, including three police officers.
 - 13/01/2012: A Boko Haram bomb attack on a military checkpoint and gun duel with soldiers in Maiduguri left 10 dead and 30 injured.
 - 07/12/2011: an explosion linked to Boko Haram killed eight persons in Oriyapata Area, Kaduna city.
 - 04/12/2011: A soldier, a police officer and a civilian died from bomb and gun attacks on police stations and two banks in Azare, Bauchi state.
 - 26/11/2011: Three police officers and a civilian wounded in a Boko Haram bomb and shooting attacks in Geidam, Yobe State, while six churches, a police stations, a pub, a shopping complex, a High Court and Local Council buildings and 11 cars were burnt in the attacks.
 - 04/11/2011: About 150 persons killed in coordinated Boko Haram bombing and shooting attacks on police facilities in Damaturu and Potiskum in Yobe state.

Boko Haram Terrorist Activities and Humanitarian Emergencies in Nigeria

Recent report by Human Rights Watch has confirmed that nine hundred and thirty five (935) people had been killed since the sect launched a violent campaign in 2009 including two hundred and fifty (250) in 2012 alone (*Vanguard*, 2012, Jan 24). Boko Haram on June 16, 2011 produced the first suicide bombing experience which happened in the attack of the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters in Abuja. Within a very short timeline, the sect also successfully shocked the country with its second suicide mission at the United Nations (UN) House, Abuja which led to deaths of about Eleven (11) UN officials and Twelve (12) non-UN officials. The identified casualties include fourteen (14) men and seven (7) women. Also, one hundred and sixteen (116) persons were injured (sixty four (64) were members of the UN officials; thirty six (36) were non-UN staff and sixteen (16) unidentified persons (The Nation, 2011).

Apart from the foregoing Boko Haram sect had claimed responsibility for series of terrorist attacks in some parts of the Northern States of Nigeria. The following timeline of Boko Haram attacks between November 2011 and January 2012 was presented in *Sunday Punch*, (January 22, 2012, p5).

Based on the above recorded and many unrecorded attacks by Boko Haram, Balogun (2011) noted that from a marginal

Islamic sect employing gunmen on motorbikes to spread terror, the Boko Haram has developed into a more sophisticated terror machine, using methods that undermine national security, created humanitarian emergencies and displacement of citizens.

Terrorism and the Retroactive Security Sector

Boko Haram's terrorist activities represent a serious national security issue with serious challenges to Nigerian security system. There are identifiable factors that constitute major obstacles to Nigerian security system. The following are some of the militating factors against effective control mechanisms against Boko Haram in Nigeria include:

1. **Poor intelligence gathering:** The escalation of the sect's activities in recent years has been linked to the incompetence of the Nigerian security agencies to tackle terrorism due to the sector's failure in intelligence gathering. According to Tinubu (2011) the situation in Borno State, [the country base of the Boko Haram sect] would not have been this bad if government had been more proactive because intelligence gathering was needed to fight Boko Haram (*Newswatch*, 2011, August 1, p.19).
2. **Security inter-agency rivalry:** The Usman Gaji Galtimari's Committee, set up by the Federal Government following bomb attacks in Nigeria by Boko Haram submitted that there was a general failure of effective and coordinated intelligence gathering and its deployment to forestall events with undesirable consequences. It was emphasized that there is no high level of security network/forum (outside the statutory national security institutions) that will enable an informal meeting between the government and the top level security stakeholders (*Newswatch*, 2011, October 10, p. 18).
3. **Systemic corruption:** The incompetence of the Nigeria Police Force and other security agencies in fighting terrorism and other security challenges is broadly linked to the systemic corruption in the Nigerian society where security sector is a component part. According to Odita (2011) the Nigerian security system is not what could be described as the best. The society does not have security at its front burner; it occupies the back seat. It is only when there are challenges the state will come up with a fire brigade approach. When the threatening issue is resolved, the society will go back to business as usual (*Newswatch*, October 10 p.14).
4. **Inefficient Security Agents with obsolete skills:** According to Okenyodo (2012) the challenge of insecurity in Nigeria is not unconnected with the police inefficiency and sticking to archaic policing that has since been replaced or over taken by modern security trends. Nigeria is yet to understand the dynamism in the police system as in practice all over the world. In Nigeria, the practice is said to recycle the same set of old people, with the same terms of reference with little or no desirable results.

Consequences of Boko Haram terrorist attacks on Nigeria

Boko Haram insurgency portend for Nigeria, social, psychological, economic and political consequences. The mayhem caused by the sect have continued to threaten the

nation's stability. Referring to the huge loss of lives and property, experts and analysts have argued that the Nigeria nation is standing on the verge of bowing to the 2005 CIA's prediction of a disintegrated Nigeria in fifteen years' time. Presently, the attacks have paralyzed business activities in most of the affected Northern States of the country. Furthermore, as a result of the escalation in the sect's aggressive and violent attacks in the affected areas coupled with the "Quit Notice" order purportedly issued by the sects to the Christians and the Southerners in the Northern parts of the country, there is a mass exodus of the people to their various states. The current situation compared to 1966, when the South Eastern region asked hercitizens to return home following the pogrom that preceded the Nigerian civil war which lasted for 30 months (The Source Magazine,2011August 1, p.14).

The present security challenge orchestrated and aggravated by *Boko Haram* may engender a civil war. As Abu (2012) noted, *Boko Haram* has remained a puzzling phenomenon. Their bomb and gun attacks which have become more frequent, ferocious and devastating always leave in their trail very perplexing questions: Why is *Boko Haram* inflicting such pain on the nation and its people? What does the Islamic sect want? In a nutshell, *Boko Haram* onslaughts have led to loss of lives and properties, which also have adverse effects on human and social capital formation and development.

Combating Boko Haram: Challenges and Prospects

The challenges posed to corporate existence of Nigeria cannot be left on the platform of avoidance. The following multidimensional approaches have to be effected.

- a) **The deployment of security agents or Military option:** The Federal Government has made efforts to curtail the menace of this sect through deployment of security agents to the most affected areas. However, government's military option has been criticized because of obvious consequences of the military intervention which include but not limited to civilian casualties. However, the military interventionist has found support in many individuals and countries including the Western powers like United States, UK, France, Germany and others. Those who supported the military option argued on the basis that withdrawal of the military would not be an option due to the rapid growing influence of the sect across the states in the Northern part of the country. According to Useni (2011) Boko Haram ragging fire could consume the country because the sect started like a Borno affair but now it is becoming a national problem (*The Source* 2011, p.17). Therefore, it must be crushed by any available means which include the military interventionism.
- b) **Dialogue and Amnesty:** For many years, dialogue has been a potent tool of conflict resolution and its potential at resolving even the most difficult and challenging issues cannot be over emphasized. This is because, dialogue provides a platform which avails each party at war or in conflict to presents its cases or issues in a manner more like a round table talk where both party can reach an agreement. On the forgoing the anti-military interventionist protesters rest their support. Those who are

against dialogue in resolving Boko Haram insurgency saw the sect as “faceless terrorists” who have no clear agenda or goal(s) unlike the Niger Delta Militants. The position of Goddy Okafor on Boko Haram, as reported by Amechi Nweke (2011) was that the sect wants to make Nigeria a terrorist nation. Generally, critics have argued against dialoguing with the terrorists on the fact that such could motivate other people into criminalities thereby constituting themselves as terror groups that may later demand for such a “pay for service” in/as dialogue.

- c) **Legal Actions:** The legal control had been applied on both the arrested members of the sect as well as on the police officers indicted in the killing of the former leader, Mohammed Yusuf in July, 30 2009. The prosecution of these officers was premised on mitigating the revenge mission embarked upon by the sect for the killing its leader and other members (*The Source*, 2011, p.19). However, it is noteworthy that even the trial of these police officers involved had not in any way been able to quell the insurgents’ violent attacks in the country by Boko Haram.

Strategic Options for stalking Boko Haram Insurgency

Broad and specific ways highlighted as panacea in addressing Boko Haram insurgency and other security challenges in Nigeria include:

1. **Sovereign National Conference (SNC):** There is the need to reconstruct the Nigeria political structure through SNC, to reflect the heterogeneous nature or status of the country. Nigeria remains a composite of distinct nationalities brought under one entity known as Nigeria. There is therefore, the need for Sovereign National Conference (SNC) as a forum for national discussions on issues relating to human security among others.
2. **Improved intelligence gathering:** Intelligence provides government with the needed tools for decision making. Johnson (2009) corroborated that regardless of which aspect of intelligence one has in mind – product, process, mission, or organization, the bottom line is that good governmental decisions rely on accurate, complete, unbiased, and timely information about the capabilities and intentions of other nations, terrorist organizations, and subversive groups. Nigeria security system must be proactive in order to forestall any security breach or threats to the collectives. It must be comprehensive as well as coordinated into a meaningful whole and be free of political spin.
3. **Security Inter-Agencies Collaboration:** The Nigerian security system has over the years been characterized with inter-agency rivalries and struggle for supremacy, which have undermined crime control and management, and created loopholes for insecurities in Nigeria. So, rather than get trapped in the frivolities of supremacy, all the security forces should cooperate with one another in manners that produce maximum best results.
4. **Good governance:** This is sine-qua-non to security. Therefore, political leaders must be accountable and transparent to guarantee the safety of lives and properties of the citizens, which is one of the government’s fundamental responsibilities. Furthermore, government must make provision for eradication of poverty, illiteracy,

unemployment, and all other things capable of instigating insecurity.

5. **Eradication of corruption:** Corruption remains rife, and obstacle to nation building. Corruption also undermines efforts at combating terrorism. There must therefore be a deliberate attempt to formulate anti-corruption policies or improve upon the established anti-corruption institution in order to checkmate the phenomenal influence of corruption in the national character of the Nigeria citizens.
6. **Effective penal system:** Culture of impunity encourages high rate of criminal activities. Therefore, as part of the efforts towards eradicating Boko Haram insurgency, the legal framework must be applied on all such patterns of behaviour in tandem with the state’s criminal codes. This however, may invariably lead to deterrence, justice, and respect of basic rights of others in the society.
7. **National orientation:** This is important in creating awareness about socially acceptable behavioural patterns in society. It has the capacity to bring about change in behaviour of the Nigerians from such anti-nationalist elements to a more socially conformist behavioural pattern. National orientation should focus on peace promotions, unity, human rights, constitution, justice, peaceful coexistence, inter-religious and inter-ethnic tolerance among Nigerians.
8. **Others:** Nigerians should endeavor to cooperate with security agents for exchange of information about security threats and other issues of national emergencies. According to Ihejirika (2012) whatever measures the security sector put in place, would not get the best result and fast enough unless the society as a whole cooperate and rejects terrorism (*Newswatch* p.6).

Conclusion

By and large, *Boko Haram*’sinsurgency has remained a critical issue in Nigeria’s national security and development. The spate of terrorist activities by the sect has continued to undermine Nigeria collective entity. The activities of the sect are in tandem with international terrorist networks which have remained a global challenge. Therefore, all efforts must be put in place in ensuring maximum protection of the citizens’ lives and properties. This study agrees with the former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, as cited in Bovard (2003:257) that “there is no good terror and bad terror; there is only terror”. According to Abu (2012) *Boko Haram* has become a thorn in the flesh of the nation. The thorn that can be removed, but it should be done with utmost care to ensure that not much collateral damage is done to the unity of the country. *Boko Haram* terrorist activities in its metamorphosis are still restricted to the national level but it is fast becoming a part of an international terrorist group, that must be confronted with both the National and international anti-terrorism rules of engagement and procedures.

REFERENCES

- Adejumo, A. (2011) *Problem and Challenges of Insecurity in Nigeria*. Retrieved onn14/01/2012 from: <http://chatafrik.com/articles/nigerian-affairs/items/338-the-problems-and-challenges-of-insecurity-in-nigeria.html>

- Abu, B.D (2012). "No, Not Again" in Newswatch, *Nigeria: A Threatened Federation*. February 6, p.7. Lagos.
- Awake (2011). *Terrorism: Why Does It Happen? When Will It End?*. New York: Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society. June.
- Conklin (2007) *Criminology, 7th edition*. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.
- Bovard, J. (2003). *Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice, and Peace to Rid the World of Evil*. New York: Palgrave Macmillian.
- Daniel Alabrah (2011) "UN House Bombing: Security Chiefs Must Go – Sara-Igbe. Says 70 per cent Northern Leaders Support Boko Haram". *Sunday Sun*, September 4. P.10. Lagos.
- Dapo Akinrefon (2012) "Let Return to Aburi Accord – Adeniyi" *Vanguard Politics*, January 30
- Dike Onwuamaeze and Ishaya Ibrahim (2011). "Why Security Agencies Fail Us", in *Newswatch: Ali Tishau The Elusive Boko Haram Kingpin. October 10*. Lagos
- Eten, I.A. (2004). "Ethnicity, Ethno-Class Relations and Crisis of Nigeria's Ending National Question, and Political Instability" in D. Oni, S. Gupta, et al (eds) *Nigeria and Globalization: Discourses on Identity Politics and Social Conflict*. Ibadan: Centre for Black and African Art and Civilisation (CBAAC).
- Farouk Chothia (2012). "Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?" *BBC African Service*. Funsho Balogun (2011) "Methods of A killing Machine" in *TheNews, Inside Boko Haram: Methods and Tactics of a Terror Machine*. August 1. Lagos.
- Ikime, O. (1987) "Towards Understanding the 'National Question'". *African Event*. June, pp28-31.
- Iredia, T., (2011). "What is National Security" in *Vanguard*. Retrieved on 7/02/2012 from <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/12/what-is-national-security/>
- Ishaya Ibarahim (2011). "Boko Haram killings" in Newswatch, *Boko Haram Killings: The Shocking Details*. August 1. Lagos.
- Johnson, L.K (2009) "Introduction" in L.K Johnson (Ed) *Handbook of Intelligence Studies*: New York: Routledge.
- Kingsley Omonobi & Mitaire Ikpen (2102) "I'll fight Boko Haram to standstill – New IGP" *Vanguard*, January 27: Retrieved 27/01/2012 from: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/i-ll-fight-boko-haram-to-standstill/Lawani>
- Mikairu & Daniel Eteghe (2012) "Sacking IGP, No Solution To Bombings In The Country – Yari". *Vanguard*, January 27. Retrieved on 27/01/2012 from: <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/sacking-igp-no-solution-to-bombings-in-the-country-yari/Mureen Chigo> (2011) "The Boko Haram Kingpin they cannot arrest in Newswatch, *Ali Tishau The Elusive Boko Haram Kingpin. October 10*,
- Neumann, P.R, and Smith, M.L.R. (2008) *The Strategy of Terrorism: How It Works, and Why It Fails*. New York: Rutledge.
- Newswatch (2012) *Nigeria: A Threatened Federation*. February 6. Lagos.
- Newswatch (2011). *Boko Haram Killings: The Shocking Details*. August 1. Lagos Ndahi Marama (2012) "We'll Attack Sokoto, Boko Haram Warns Sultan, Tanbuwal, Others" *Vanguard News*, January 29.
- Kemi Okenyodo (2012). Interviewed on *AIT News at 8pm*, January 24.
- Onochie-Igbiodu, P. (2011) *The Challenges of Security in Nation*. Retrieved on 14/01/2012 from: <http://allafrica.com/stories/201101110348.html>
- Otite, O. (1990). *Ethnic Pluralism and Ethnicity in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Shameson C.I Limited.
- Fagbenle, T. (2011) "The Challenge of Nation-Building", *Sunday Punch*, June 26 p.80. Lagos.
- Uduma Kalu (2012) "We 'll dialogue with Boko Haram if... — Jonathan" *Vanguard*, January 26. Retrieved on 27/01/2012 from:<http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/we-lldialogue-with-boko-haram-if-jonathan/>
- UNDP, Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security, 1994 p.22.
- The Punch (2012). *Boko Haram Leader Defends Attacks*, Thursday January 12 p.8. Lagos.
- The Nation (2011). *Church Death Toll Hits 43*. Friday December 30. PP64. Lagos.
- Sunday Punch (2012) "Omoba", January 29, Back page. Lagos.
- Sunday Punch (2012) "Israel offers counter-terrorism assistance to Nigeria". *Sunday Punch*. January 22, p.5. Lagos.
- Sunday Punch (2012) "Abbreviated Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks". *Sunday Punch*. January 22, p.5. Lagos.
- Official Document:
- Nigeria: Criminal Code Act Cap. 77 Laws of the Federation.
- Online sources:
- <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501> (Accessedn27/01/2012).
 - <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sect> (Accessed on 27/01/2012).
 - <http://www.answers.com/islamic-fundamentalism> (Accessed 27/01/2012).
