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RESEARCH ARTICLE

SYSTEMATIC STRATEGIES FOR ENHANCING YOUTH EMPLOYMENT QUALITY IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY DURING BEIJING'S "15TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN" PERIOD

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ABSTRACT

The platform economy has become a core carrier of youth employment in Beijing; however, employment quality exhibits significant skill-based stratification. Notable disparities exist among young people with different skill levels concerning income stability, career development, and industry distribution. Enhancing youth employment quality faces four major bottlenecks: the polarization of employment quality due to skill stratification, the exacerbation of disparities by platform rules and industry segmentation, algorithmic control coupled with a lack of protections, and insufficient alignment between training and job requirements. This paper proposes a systematic four-dimensional strategy centered on "skills matching," comprising "stratified training, rules optimization, safety-net protections, and collaborative efforts." This approach aims to enable young people across skill levels to share the dividends of the digital economy, improve employment quality, and provide youth talent support for building Beijing into a global benchmark city for the digital economy.

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INTRODUCTION

Currently, at the critical juncture of concluding the "14th Five-Year Plan" and urgently formulating the "15th Five-Year Plan," Beijing, serving as a core engine for China's digital economy development and the primary entity building a global benchmark city for the digital economy, faces a macro-environment characterized by a global economic slowdown, intensifying international trade competition, and increasing pressure for domestic economic transformation. Simultaneously, it is experiencing labor market changes including pressure on university graduate employment rates, accelerated iteration of traditional jobs, and the vigorous emergence of new forms of employment. As a core carrier of the deep integration of digital technology and the real economy, the platform economy had already facilitated employment for over 2 million young people in Beijing by 2024, accounting for 38.7% of the city's total youth employment. However, its characteristic of "skills determining earnings, differentiation dominating the landscape" (based on empirical data from the Beijing Emerging Youth Group Tracking Survey 2021-2024) results in significant stratification in the employment quality of high-, medium-, and low-skilled youth—the comprehensive employment quality index for high-skilled youth reaches 76.4 points, while it is only 42.8 points for the low-skilled group, with the medium-skilled group in a state of "transitional vulnerability." During the "15th Five-Year Plan" period, Beijing needs to focus on "skills matching," leverage the in-depth development of the platform economy, and construct a systematic strategy of "training for capability enhancement, rules optimization, safety-net protections, and collaborative efforts" to promote the sharing of digital economy dividends among young people with different skills and inject youth dynamism into the construction of a global benchmark city for the digital economy.

Scale Characteristics and Stratification Pattern of Youth Employment in Beijing's Platform Economy: Based on data from the Beijing Emerging Youth Group Tracking Survey 2021-2024 (8,132 valid samples), combined with the progress of building Beijing into a global benchmark city for the digital economy, the platform economy has become a core carrier of youth employment in Beijing, but the quality of this employment shows significant skill-based stratification, specifically manifested in the following three aspects:

The Platform Economy as a "Key Reservoir" for Youth Employment, Expanding in Both Scale and Format: In

terms of scale, over 2 million young people aged 16-35 were employed in Beijing's platform economy in 2024, accounting for 38.7% of the city's total youth employment. This encompasses 12 types of occupations, including food delivery riders, live stream operations, and online education instructors. Among these, low-skill positions (e.g., delivery personnel, ride-hailing drivers) accounted for 42.3%, high-skill positions (e.g., algorithm engineers, content creators) for 28.7%, and medium-skill positions (e.g., platform dispatchers, basic operations) for 40%, forming a job structure characterized by a "large middle and smaller ends." In terms of business formats, Beijing, as a core agglomeration area for the platform economy, hosted platform enterprises accounting for 18% of the national total in 2024. Leading local platforms like ByteDance, Meituan, and Baidu have built a full-format system integrating "content creation + two-sided transactions." Content creation platforms accounted for 36.5% of practitioners, while two-sided transaction platforms accounted for 63.5%, providing diverse employment options for young people with different skill levels.

Employment Quality Exhibits a Stratified Characteristic of "Skills Determining Earnings," with Significant Disparities: From a composite index perspective, the average comprehensive employment quality index for young platform workers in Beijing is 58.7 points (on a 0-100 scale), but skill stratification leads to vast differences: the high-skilled group (digital skills index >70 points) scores 76.4, the medium-skilled group (40-70 points) scores 59.2, and the low-skilled group (≤40 points) scores only 42.8. The high-skilled group's score is 1.78 times that of the low-skilled group. Looking at specific dimensions: Regarding income stability, the high-skilled group has a average monthly income of 9,658 RMB with a volatility rate of 12.3%, while the low-skilled group earns 5,426 RMB monthly with a volatility rate of 38.7%. The income of the former is 1.78 times that of the latter, and its income volatility risk is only 31.8% of the latter's. In terms of career development, the high-skilled group receives an average of 3.2 training sessions per year with a promotion rate of 28.7%, compared to 0.8 training sessions and a 4.2% promotion rate for the low-skilled group. The high-skilled group's training frequency and promotion rate are 4 times and 6.8 times those of the low-skilled group, respectively, demonstrating a Matthew Effect where "the high-skilled get stronger, and the low-skilled get weaker."

Digital Skills, Platform Type, and Industry Attributes Create an "Adaptation Effect," Reinforcing the Stratification Pattern: As a core mediating variable, digital skills have a total mediating effect of 44.6%, with significant group differences: the mediating effect accounts for 47.4% for the high-skilled group, 42.2% for the medium-skilled group, and only 9.9% for the low-skilled group. From the perspective of platform type, the comprehensive employment quality index for workers on content creation platforms (live streaming, short videos) is 72.5, significantly higher than the 51.3 for those on two-sided transaction platforms (food delivery, ride-hailing). Within this, the income growth rate of the high-skilled group on content creation platforms (15.6% annually) is 2.3 times that on two-sided transaction platforms. From an industry attribute perspective, the employment quality index for workers in knowledge-intensive industries (online education, content creation) is 18.42 points higher than that for those in labor-intensive industries (delivery, ride-hailing). 78.5% of the high-skilled group is concentrated in knowledge-intensive industries, while 84.3% of the low-skilled group is locked into labor-intensive industries. This industry segmentation further solidifies the skill-based stratification.

Core Bottlenecks and Underlying Causes of Youth Employment Quality in Beijing's Platform Economy: Integrating empirical data with the reality of Beijing's platform economy development, improving employment quality for youth across skill levels currently faces four major core problems. These issues are particularly acute at the critical juncture of concluding the "14th Five-Year Plan" and formulating the "15th Five-Year Plan," hindering the inclusive growth of the platform economy.

Skill Stratification Leads to the "Polarization" of Employment Quality, Trapping the Low-Skilled Group in a "Lock-in Effect": Low-skilled youth (digital skills index ≤40 points) face the dilemma of "passive labor - low training - low quality." On one hand, their labor process is highly standardized by algorithms (e.g., mandatory navigation for food delivery), their digital skills are concentrated in basic operations (2.9/5 points), and their data processing and algorithm comprehension abilities are weak (both <1.5/5 points), making it difficult to participate in high-value-added segments. On the other hand, this group receives only 0.8 skill training sessions per year on average, and 83.6% of the training content consists of non-skill knowledge like "safety regulations." The skill upgrade rate is less than 10%, and the probability of cross-industry mobility is only 4.2%. Even when mobility occurs, it is often confined to low-value-added positions within knowledge-intensive industries (e.g., content moderation), with income increases of less than 10%, trapping them in a locked state of "insufficient skills → low-quality employment → inability to invest in skills."

Platform Rules and Industry Segmentation Exacerbate Divisions, Leaving the Medium-Skilled Group in a State of "Transitional Vulnerability": Medium-skilled youth (digital skills index 40-70 points), as a group at the "critical point of skill upgrade," face dual constraints from platform rules and industry barriers. Regarding platform rules, the "time-constrained labor" model of two-sided transaction platforms (e.g., compressed delivery times) limits their skill enhancement. While content creation platforms provide data tools, only 30% of medium-skilled individuals can use them proficiently (e.g., user profile templates). In terms of industry segmentation, 42.3% of this group works in knowledge-intensive industries and 57.7% in labor-intensive industries. Cross-industry mobility lacks support for "qualification mutual recognition." Only 12.5% achieve promotion, mostly to "basic management positions" (e.g., team leader for riders), making it difficult to break through career ceilings. 70% risk falling into the low-skilled group due to skill stagnation, exhibiting a vulnerability characterized by "upgrade or decline."

Algorithmic Control Coexists with Lack of Protections, Highlighting Rights and Risks for the Low-Skilled Group: Regarding algorithms, the "control effect" of Beijing's two-sided transaction platforms on low-skilled youth is significant. Food delivery riders cannot predict route adjustments and face an average of 4.5 overtime penalties per month; ride-hailing drivers have a vague understanding of how "service scores affect order priority," and those with low scores can only access low-value orders (e.g., short trips, congested routes), suffering income losses exceeding 20%. Regarding

protections, social security coverage for low-skilled youth is only 41.3%, and only 18.7% have signed long-term service agreements. Income volatility exceeds 38.7%. When order interruptions cause income drops of over 30%, only 9.8% can obtain temporary assistance from the platform, indicating a lack of an effective bottom-line mechanism for labor rights.

Training is Insufficiently Matched to Job Requirements, Lacking "Precise Empowerment" for Skill Upgrading: There is a "mismatch between supply and demand" in current skills training for young platform workers in Beijing. For high-skilled youth, there is a lack of advanced training aligned with AI and cross-border digital operations; only 28% can participate in courses like "data modeling" or "algorithm optimization." For medium-skilled youth, the coverage of standardized training tools (e.g., order analysis templates) is only 35%, making it difficult to break through the 60-point "skill threshold." For low-skilled youth, cross-over training resources are scarce; only 5% can participate in transition courses like "short video editing" or "basic customer service operations." The disconnect between training and job requirements fails to effectively support the improvement of employment quality.

Systematic Strategies for Enhancing Youth Employment Quality in Beijing's Platform Economy during the "15th Five-Year Plan" Period: To address the aforementioned issues and align with the goals of building Beijing into a global benchmark city for the digital economy and the tasks outlined in the "15th Five-Year Plan," it is imperative to focus on "skills matching" as the core and construct a four-dimensional strategic framework comprising "stratified training, rules optimization, safety-net protections, and collaborative efforts." This aims to enable young people with varying skill levels to share the benefits of the platform economy.

Anchor the Benchmark City Positioning, Build a Stratified and Classified Digital Skills Training System, and Overcome the "Skill Threshold" Constraint on Youth Employment: Digital skills serve as the core mediating variable for youth employment quality in the platform economy (total mediating effect 44.6%), yet the mediating effect differs significantly across skill groups (47.4% for the high-skilled group, 9.9% for the low-skilled group). During the "15th Five-Year Plan" period, Beijing must leverage resources from universities, platform enterprises, and digital economy parks to create a "targeted training" system tailored to young people with different skill levels, thereby addressing the polarization dilemma where "the high-skilled become stronger, and the low-skilled become weaker."

For High-Skilled Youth: Create a "Digital Innovation Talent Pool" to support the high-end development of the platform economy. High-skilled youth (digital skills index >70 points) are the core force for Beijing's platform economy to participate in global competition. Their employment quality effect at the τ=0.75 quantile on content creation platforms reaches 32.89 ($p<0.01$), necessitating the unleashing of their innovation potential through "skills deepening." Recommendations: (1)

Joint Government-Enterprise-University Initiatives: Led by the Beijing Municipal Bureau of Economy and Information Technology, collaborate with leading local platform companies like ByteDance and Baidu, and prestigious universities such as Tsinghua and Peking University to co-establish "Platform Economy Innovation Labs." Offer advanced courses like "Data Modeling and Algorithm Optimization" and "User Growth and Traffic Operation," aiming to cultivate 10,000 high-skilled young individuals annually with capabilities in AI application and cross-border digital operations. Incorporate them into Beijing's digital economy talent pool, granting them policy incentives such as talent apartments and startup subsidies. (2)

International Skills Benchmarking: Capitalize on Beijing's development as a global digital economy benchmark city to introduce the EU's "Digital Skills Passport" certification system. Encourage high-skilled youth to participate in cross-border platform operations (e.g., TikTok Global Creator Program) and organize annual exchange and study programs for 2,000 participants to international digital economy enterprises (e.g., Amazon Web Services, Google Developer Platform), thereby enhancing their global employment competitiveness.

For Medium-Skilled Youth: Implement a "Threshold Breakthrough Plan" to resolve the "transitional vulnerability" predicament. Medium-skilled youth (digital skills index 40-70 points) constitute 40% of young platform workers in Beijing. Their core challenge is "strong basic skills but weak advanced capabilities"—only 28% manage to surpass the 60-point "skill threshold." The "15th Five-Year Plan" period should prioritize facilitating their transition into the high-skilled group: (1)

Empowerment through Standardized Tools: The Beijing Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, in partnership with platforms like Meituan and JD.com, should develop lightweight tools (e.g., "Platform Operation Data Templates,""Algorithm Rule Interpretation Manuals," one-click order analysis report generation) to lower the barriers to data processing. The goal is to increase the data processing proficiency rate among medium-skilled youth from 32.5% to 60% by 2028. (2)

Job-Training" Linkage: Pilot a "Semi-Skilled Job Internship Certification System" in platform economy clusters like Chaoyang and Haidian districts. For positions such as content moderation assistant and junior data annotator, allow young people to substitute 40% of training hours with three months of practical job experience. Those who pass the assessment will receive a Beijing "Intermediate Digital Skills Certificate" and be prioritized for recommendation to knowledge-intensive platforms (e.g., online education, live stream operations). This initiative is expected to assist 50,000 medium-skilled youth annually in achieving "skill upgrade and job transition."

For Low-Skilled Youth: Strengthen "Basic Training + Cross-Boundary Transition" to break industry lock-in. Low-skilled youth (digital skills index ≤40 points) are highly concentrated (84.3%) in labor-intensive industries like food delivery and ride-hailing, experiencing an income volatility rate of 38.7%. "Safety-net training + cross-boundary support" is crucial to overcome "skill lock-in."

Mandatory Basic Skills Training: Led by the Beijing Municipal Commission of Transport and the Commerce Bureau, require food delivery and ride-hailing platforms to incorporate "introductory digital skills training" (e.g., platform tool operation, understanding algorithm rules) as a mandatory access condition for practitioners. The annual training frequency should be no less than 1.5 sessions, and training

participation rates should be linked to the platform's annual qualification review. The target is to achieve 100% basic skills coverage for low-skilled youth by 2026.

Cross-Boundary Training Fund Support: Allocate 3% of the revenue from Beijing's platform enterprises to establish a "Low-Skilled Youth Transition Fund." Partner with content creation platforms like Kuaishou and Xiaohongshu to provide introductory training such as "short video editing" and "basic customer service operations." Provide annual subsidies for 100,000 low-skilled youth to transition, offering a three-month "traffic support period" (e.g., lowered account entry barriers) for those who successfully transition. The goal is to increase the cross-industry mobility rate of low-skilled youth from 4.2% to 15% by 2028.

Focus on Algorithm Fairness and Industry Mobility, Optimize the Platform Economy Rule System, and Mitigate the "Widening Divergence" in Youth Employment: Beijing's platform economy faces dual constraints of "industry segmentation" and "algorithmic control"—the employment quality index in knowledge-intensive industries is 18.42 points higher than in labor-intensive industries, and the employment quality effect for low-skilled youth on two-sided transaction platforms is merely 1.89 ($p>0.1$). During the "15th Five-Year Plan" period, aiming for "rule transparency and mobility facilitation," it is necessary to establish the nation's first pilot program for platform economy employment fairness.

Promote "Graded and Classified" Algorithm Regulation to Protect the Labor Rights of Low-Skilled Youth. (1) **Labor Intensity Ceiling System:** The Beijing Cyberspace Administration and the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau should jointly issue the "Platform Algorithm Fairness Management Measures," requiring labor-intensive platforms like food delivery and ride-hailing to set "daily orderupper limits (e.g., ≤50 orders/day for delivery riders)" and "continuous work duration alerts (e.g., mandatory 20-minute rest every 4 hours)." Algorithm logic must be filed with regulatory authorities. Conduct annual third-party "algorithm fairness audits," focusing on checking for "skill discrimination" in order distribution for low-skilled groups. Audit results should be linked to platform credit ratings.

Error Tolerance Mechanism Pilot: Pilot "flexible delivery times for food delivery during adverse weather conditions (e.g., heavy rain, snow)" in core urban areas like Dongcheng and Xicheng—automatically extend delivery time by 30% and reduce overtime penalties by 50%. This is expected to reduce annual income loss for low-skilled youth by approximately 200 million yuan, lowering income volatility from 38.7% to below 30%.

Establish "Cross-Platform Professional Qualification Mutual Recognition" to Break Down Industry Mobility Barriers. (1) **Qualification Mutual Recognition System:** Led by the Beijing Municipal Human Resources and Social Security Bureau, formulate the "Catalog of Mutual Recognition of Platform Professional Qualifications." Convert "dispatch system operation experience" from food delivery station assistants into "basic operation qualifications" for content creation platforms. Incorporate "customer service ratings" from ride-hailing drivers into assessments for online customer service positions. The target is to achieve mutual recognition of qualifications for over 10 platform professions by 2026, helping 30,000 young people achieve cross-platform mobility annually.

"Job Reservation" in Knowledge-Intensive Platforms: Require knowledge-intensive platforms in Beijing (e.g., online education, live stream operations) to reserve 15% of entry-level positions for medium-skilled youth, implementing "training through employment"—complete digital skills training within six months of employment (platform covers 80% of training costs), and convert to regular employees upon passing assessment. The goal is to increase the proportion of medium-skilled youth entering knowledge-intensive industries from 42.3% to 55% by 2028.

Improve the Differentiated Social Security System, Provide a Safety Net for Low-Skilled Youth Risks, and Strengthen Platform Enterprise Responsibility: Among Beijing's platform youth, 62% hold non-local household registration, and social security coverage for the low-skilled group is only 41.3%. During the "15th Five-Year Plan" period, it is necessary to build a "skills-linked protection" system to balance "flexibility" and "security."

Tiered Social Security Policies: Incentivize the High-Skilled, Provide a Safety Net for the Low-Skilled

"Incentive-Based Protection" for High-Skilled Youth: Link digital skill levels to occupational injury insurance premiums—a 10% premium reduction for each level of skill upgrade (maximum reduction 30%). Simultaneously, allow high-skilled youth to contribute to housing provident funds under a "flexible employment status," enjoying the same loan quotas as formal employees, thereby incentivizing continuous skill improvement.

Safety-Net Protection" for Low-Skilled Youth: Establish a "Beijing Platform Youth Temporary Assistance Mechanism." Automatically trigger temporary assistance of up to 2,000 yuan per month for low-skilled youth whose income volatility exceeds 40%. Mandate platforms to pay for "occupational injury insurance + supplementary medical insurance" for full-time low-skilled workers, aiming for 100% coverage by 2027, thereby addressing the issues of "difficulty accessing healthcare and asserting rights."

Strengthen the Primary Responsibility of Platform Enterprises: Mandatory Fund Allocation + Employment Quality Assessment.

Mandatory Skills Enhancement Fund Allocation: Based on the "compensation theory of skill-biased technological progress," require Beijing-based platform enterprises to allocate 2% of their revenue to a "Youth Skills Enhancement Fund," dedicated specifically to training low- and medium-skilled youth. Fund usage must be included in corporate social responsibility reports. Enterprises failing to meet standards will face restrictions on expansion scale (e.g., a 30% reduction in quotas for new riders/drivers).

Employment Quality Assessment Standards: Led by the Beijing Municipal Development and Reform Commission, formulate the "Beijing Platform Economy Employment Quality Standards," setting "compliance thresholds" across three dimensions: income stability (≥40 points), skills training (≥1 session per year), and career promotion (rate ≥8%).

Annually publish the "Beijing Platform Employment Quality Ranking." Platforms that fail to meet standards for three consecutive years will have access to policy benefits such as tax incentives and land support revoked.

Build a "Government-Enterprise-Society" Collaborative Ecosystem to Solidify Support for High-Quality Youth Employment: Improving youth employment quality in the platform economy requires multi-stakeholder collaboration. During the "15th Five-Year Plan" period, Beijing needs to integrate government policies, enterprise resources, and social forces to create an "inclusive digital employment ecosystem."

Government Level: Strengthen Assessment and Services.

Incorporate into Performance Evaluations: Include the number of digital skills trainees and the platform youth employment quality index into the employment assessment indicators for the Beijing municipal and district governments. Districts achieving their targets will receive up to 50 million yuan in special employment subsidies.

Unified Certification Platform: Establish the "Beijing Youth Digital Skills Certification Platform," integrating training resources from universities, enterprises, and industry associations, and realize the entire process of "training-assessment-certification-employment" online. The goal is to cover all young platform practitioners by 2025.

Society Level: Supplement Market Resource Gaps

Industry Standard Formulation: Encourage the Beijing Platform Economy Association to publish a "Skills-Income Correlation Index," updating the average income and career development paths for youth with different skill levels monthly, providing a "skills upgrade guide" for young people.

Public Welfare Course Support: Support NGOs in partnering with communities to offer "zero-base digital skills literacy classes" (e.g., smartphone operation, platform tool use), aiming to cover 50% of low-skilled youth annually, thereby addressing the "starting obstacle for skills upgrading." It is projected that by 2028, the digital skills upgrade rate for low-skilled youth will increase from 9.8% to 25%.

During the "15th Five-Year Plan" period, to develop the platform economy and enhance youth employment quality, Beijing must closely adhere to its positioning as a "global benchmark city for the digital economy." It should use "skills matching" to resolve differentiation, "rules optimization" to promote fairness, and "safety-net protections" to secure the baseline.

Through the strategies outlined above, the employment quality of youth with different skills can transition from "intensifying stratification" to "balanced improvement," injecting youthful dynamism into the construction of a global benchmark city for the digital economy. This will achieve mutual empowerment between "in-depth development of the platform economy" and "high-quality youth employment," providing a "Beijing Solution" for employment governance in the national digital economy era.

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